The special issue 'Fragile States: A Political Concept' investigates the emergence, dissemination and reception of the notion of 'state fragility'. It analyses the process of conceptualisation, examining how the 'fragile states' concept was framed by policy makers to describe reality in accordance with their priorities in the fields of development and security. The contributors to the issue investigate the instrumental use of the 'state fragility' label in the legitimisation of Western policy interventions in countries facing violence and profound poverty. They also emphasise the agency of actors 'on the receiving end', describing how the elites and governments in so-called 'fragile states' have incorporated and reinterpreted the concept to fit their own political agendas. A first set of articles examines the role played by the World Bank, the OECD, the European Union and the g7+ coalition of 'fragile states' in the transnational diffusion of the concept, which is understood as a critical element in the new discourse on international aid and security. A second set of papers employs three case studies (Sudan, Indonesia and Uganda) to explore the processes of appropriation, reinterpretation and the strategic use of the 'fragile state' concept.
Introduction
The terminology 'fragile states' should only be used with caution […] I strongly feel that it is not a neutral terminology. Apart from the emotional implications, it has financial and political implications. Moreover, it gives us a bad image in the eyes of the investors we so badly need. (Address by Pierre Nkurunziza, President of Burundi, to the United Nations General Assembly, March 2009) The capacity to shape the representation of reality is now commonly viewed as an attribute of power, along with military and diplomatic capacities. In this context the concept of 'fragile states' can be seen as an attempt by state powers to describe reality in accordance with their foreign policy priorities. The contributors to this special issue seek to disentangle this reality by exploring the notion of 'state fragility', the conditions under which the label 'state fragility' emerged in certain policy circles and how it has been received by actors in fragile states. Hence the contributions to this issue are twofold in nature: they examine both the transnational emergence and diffusion of the notion of 'state fragility' and its reception in the so-called 'fragile countries'. In the first part of the issue the contributors focus on major Western donors and their understanding and use of 'state fragility', opening the 'black box' and exploring the strategies at work behind the process of conceptualisation. In the second, they investigate how countries that have been labelled 'fragile' have internalised and reinterpreted the 'fragile state' classification, and how they have exploited the concept for their own strategic purposes. Scholars included in the issue argue that, on the donor side, the concept is primarily used to classify states facing major political crises or extreme poverty as 'fragile', 'failing' or 'failed' in order to legitimise aid spending and interventionist strategies. On the recipient side, although such labelling is generally contested, it is also frequently accepted and reinterpreted when there is the potential for political gains. The contributors find that aiddependent states frequently exploit the notion for their own purposes, in order to delay political reforms or to convince donors to invest more aid money in 'situations of fragility' (especially in periods of economic crisis, when Western countries might otherwise opt for cutbacks in foreign aid spending). The ambiguous definitions of the concept open room for different processes of appropriation at the international and local levels.
The rise of the 'fragile state' agenda Expressions such as 'weak state', 'failing state', 'collapsed state' and other variations have become pervasive, not only in practitioners' discourses but also in scholarly works. New perspectives -such as 'whole-of-government', '3D' ('defence, diplomacy, development') and '3C' ('coherent, coordinated, complementary') approaches -have been developed in order to promote Western humanitarian, reconstruction and security policies with regard to these so-called 'fragile states'. 'Principles of good international engagement in fragile states' have been drawn up by many international and regional organisations, among them the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union. 1 In the US context the National Security Guidelines of September 2002 declared failed states to be a greater threat than states with ambitions of conquest.
2 The EU followed suit in 2003, announcing that failed states constituted a major threat to European security as well. 3 This represented a policy shift, a recognition that modern wars are 'less a problem of the relations between states than a problem within states'. 4 This analysis has been substantiated by quantitative studies showing that 'state weakness' is now one of the most critical factors underlying armed violence (along with outside intervention). 5 This policy development echoes a similar shift in academic work (especially in peace and conflict studies), as reflected in the conceptual proliferation of new terms to describe the same basic phenomenon: 'collapsed state', 'failed state', 'fragile state', 'imaginary state', 'absent state', 'lame Leviathan', and 'soft state', to list just a few. 6 Every concept has a specific motivation -for example, 'lame Leviathan' or 'quasi-state' focus on sovereignty and international recognition issues, while terms like 'fragile states' and 'weak states' target service delivery and 'renegade regimes' and 'rogue states' concern state behaviour. 7 Nonetheless, many of these conceptual nuances boil down to insufficient state capacity or the unwillingness of a state to meet its obligations, generally understood as delivering 'core functions to the majority of its people'. 8 This intersection between policy and research priorities was the crucial element behind the rise of the 'fragile state' agenda in the 1990s.
Although there is nothing fundamentally new in the contemporary fragile state agenda -many anthropologists and political scientists discussed similar issues following the decolonisation movement, for instance -the agenda truly started to pick up steam in mainstream international relations in the mid-1990s. Helman and Ratner's 1993 article played a crucial role in attracting policy and academic attention to 'failed states', understood here as 'a situation where governmental structures are overwhelmed by circumstances'. 9 Although the authors make a loose distinction between degrees of collapse, 10 and advocate new conservatorships to deal with bona fide failed states, they do not delve much deeper into the analysis of the failed state phenomenon. Their contribution is nevertheless considered 'authoritative', 11 in the sense that it succeeded in setting a new research agenda. A similar research agenda was at the same time pursued by Rotberg and Fukuyama, while being nuanced and given more complexity by the likes of Zartmann from the start. 12 Helman and Ratner's initial article was clearly informed by the collapse of Somalia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s. Significantly this period also featured rising interest from major donors and international organisations in state fragility issues. For instance, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) convened its first research-preparatory workshop on this topic in April 1993, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) organised a programme on 'Linking Rehabilitation to Development: Management Revitalization of War-torn Societies' at around the same time. 13 The 1990s also saw a gradual rapprochement between the development and security fields -what has been termed the 'security-development nexus' -under the overarching umbrella of the fragile state agenda, primarily through a merger of security and development policy and the re-problematisation of security as both the result of and the precondition for development in a broader sense.
14 The concept of 'fragile states', the term generally preferred by development experts, intersected with the concept of 'failed states', which was favoured by security experts and diplomats (as exemplified in speeches by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright). 15 The idea that 'state fragility' could be a threat to the national security of Western countries gained additional traction after 9/11, when the al-Qaeda terrorist network attacked the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Because the government of Afghanistan was hosting members of this terrorist network, countries with no legitimate or institutionalised government were suddenly perceived as potential sanctuaries for criminal activities and global terrorism. Whether they were considered 'failed' or 'failing' in the US discourse on security, or 'fragile' from a development aid perspective, most analysts agreed that new policies for international security would require a focus on the capacity of national governments in the South to control security within their territories and to provide essential services to their citizens. The emerging discourse on fragile states played a role in the diffusion of this new conception of foreign policy based on the security and development 'nexus'. The implications of the 'securitisation' of the fragile state discourse are spelled out in Kofi Annan's re-conceptualisation of security threats after 9/11. For the UN Secretary-General it was clear that these threats were increasingly coming from governments that were being 'allowed to violate the rights of their individual citizens'. These countries had thus 'become a menace not only to their own people, but also to their own neighbours, and indeed the world'. 16 An estimated 105 countries with oppressive or semi-oppressive governments fall under Annan's sprawling definition of potential terrorist threats, 17 justifying all forms of intervention by the 'core' democratic countries. 18 In the field of development the focus on addressing the capacity of state institutions in countries facing turbulence stems from the shift towards a new aid allocation system in international assistance. In the late 1990s, while the World Bank was expressing renewed interest in the impact of adequate governance institutions on results in the implementation of aid programmes at the country level, the major traditional donors opened a debate on 'aid effectiveness' that resulted in the 'Monterey Consensus on Financing Development' in 2002. 19 The idea that donors should better target recipient countries according to their policy and institutional performance prepared the development community for the establishment of new resource allocation mechanisms. These mechanisms were based on the evaluation of the 'performance' of national institutions, ie their effective capacity to maintain governance mechanisms ensuring the effectiveness of disbursements in official development assistance (ODA). Aid allocation began to be channelled through a 'selectivity' principle, dedicating the most resources to countries with 'efficient' institutions and policies.
The Western donors' interest in fragile states emerged as an indirect consequence of the donors' shift towards aid selectivity. Despite the focus of aid flows on poverty reduction (rather than economic growth), several countries with weak capacities or in political crisis were unable to meet the new benchmarks. The observation that the concentration of aid flows on 'good performers' was resulting in the marginalisation of countries with 'ineffective' institutions and policies inspired growing criticism of the international financial institutions from the US Congress. The outcry led the World Bank to establish, in 2001, an initiative targeting 'low-income countries under stress' to address the specific challenges of recipient countries suffering from the effects of war, violence and political disruption. 20 Two separate World Bank internal units (the Fragile State Unit and the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit) contributed to the reframing of the discussion, moving from a focus on aid efficiency to a greater emphasis on state-and peace building. The Forum was presented as a milestone on the way to a consensual and shared recognition of the problem of 'fragile states' as a new major challenge for development. In the same year, in its Human Development Report, the UNDP published a list of 59 'top priority' and 'high priority' countries most in need of support; these states were characterised by a combination of low human development and poor performance. 22 Two major public donors, the USA and the UK, played a leading role in the construction of the policy agenda on fragility within these multilateral organisations. The new UK bilateral cooperation (following the creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997) placed special emphasis on poverty reduction, human security and the recognition of the role of the state within developing countries, supporting economic arrangements and providing laws and regulations to protect human rights. 23 US development assistance programmes also played a critical role in the emergence of the 'fragile state' concept in the new doctrine of aid selectivity, despite a systematic focus on foreign policy and national security concerns after 9/11. In 2004, for example, the US Congress refocused the mandate of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to emphasise support for poor countries; it also established the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an independent agency, to assist countries selected on the basis of their policy-performance and institutional capacities. This internalisation of the principle of selectivity within the organisational design of the US bilateral assistance scheme created conditions that allowed the initiation of a policy discussion on state fragility and development. In 2005 USAID drew up specific policy objectives for intervention in fragile states (described either as 'vulnerable states' or 'states in crisis'), depending on the degree of weakness of the political authority over the territory, the capacity of the state to deliver basic services to the population and the legitimacy of the government. 24 In line with the '3D' doctrine, the aid agency incorporated defence and diplomatic objectives into its strategy for development.
In the same year developed and developing countries under the aegis of the OECD endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, committing to make aid effectiveness a high priority (along with other principles, such as 'harmonisation', 'alignment' and the 'ownership' of aid delivery').
25 These aid effectiveness principles were equally applied to fragile states and 'to environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for basic service delivery'. 26 Thus, promoted by a vast array of organisations including the World Bank, the OECD and major aid donors (including the USA, the UK and the EU), the 'fragile state' agenda progressively gained traction in the 2000s.
Critical studies vs policy analysis Scholarly research on fragile states has undergone a similar expansion since Helman and Ratner's seminal contribution. At the centre of this contemporary literature lies a complex dichotomy between 'problem solvers' and 'critical scholars'. 27 Problem solvers focus on performance issues, seeking ways to provide recommendations for governments, international institutions and technical agencies, whereas critical scholars are inclined to question the values and assumptions underpinning the fragile state concept. From a problem-solving perspective some have explored the issue of the classification of 'fragile states' and the possibility of forecasting state collapse. 28 Others have examined the importance of traditional and non-traditional actors in state-building processes, as well as the current production of normative standards and good practices ('soft laws') in international state building. 29 In this context certain scholars have adopted a quantitative approach to measuring state fragility, while others have opted for a qualitative approach, investigating the specific mechanisms of state fragility in specific case studies. 30 Another strand of the literature has approached the recent conceptualisation of 'fragile states' from a more critical perspective, and has done so from two angles. On the one hand, scholars have examined the manipulation of the norm by powerful state actors, a process that has deprived local actors of their agency and legitimised interventions by Western governmental agencies. These researchers have also questioned the linkages between failed or fragile states and terrorism, which underlie the rationale behind the security-development nexus. 31 On the other hand, scholars have criticised the analytical validity of the 'fragile state' concept itself. Ziaja and Fabra Mata show that, while most indices agree on the classification of certain countries (such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Iraq) as fragile, the same indices significantly diverge regarding the status of other countries (including Cuba, North Korea, Israel and China). Hagman and Hoehne critically emphasise the 'teleological belief in the convergence of all nation-states' inherent in the Western concept of 'state failure', demonstrating the negative implications of the use of the concept by means of empirical evidence from the Somali territories. Having analysed the US intervention policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, Nuruzzaman similarly highlights the negative effects of the unreflective use of the concepts of 'state failure' and 'state failing' in international relations. Call criticises the concept of 'state failure' as deficient because it conflates states as diverse as Colombia, Malawi, Somalia, Iraq, Haiti and Tajikistan and prescribes that aid donors 'react in a formulaic manner' to enhance state capacity -even though these countries drastically differ in terms of security, capacity and legitimacy. Nay disputes the analytical underpinning of the research agenda on fragile and failed states, interpreting the framework as the reactivation of 'developmentalist' theories. Both Call and Nay argue for the abandonment of the concept, as its use in such widely divergent and problematic ways proves that it has lost all analytical utility. 32 The contribution of this special issue The concepts of 'fragile' or 'failed' states (and other derivatives) are still in widespread use, and are arguably more central to the academic literature and to policy making than ever before. Thanks to an increasing awareness among scholars and policy makers of the shortcomings and limitations of the concept, more diplomatically formulated versions of the label have emerged, such as 'situations of fragility' (proposed in 2007 by the OECD) and 'countries and regions in crisis, post-crisis and fragile situation' (a recent reframing by the EU). 33 In this context the purpose of this special issue is to underline certain political dynamics at play behind the logics of labelling. Building on the existing literature (especially the critical strand), the papers assembled here explore the development of the research agenda from two different angles.
A first set of contributors investigates the development of the policy agenda on fragile states from the donor perspective, questioning the structural conditions under which international agencies have promoted (or have avoided promoting) the discourse on fragile states. The contributors take a peek behind the scenes, analysing the discourse of specific actors and examining the conditions of knowledge production. Nay investigates the role played by the World Bank and the OECD in the development and transnational dissemination of the fragile state discourse in relation to the major traditional donors' conception of international aid. He focuses particular attention on three distinct cognitive and normative processes affecting the policy-oriented concepts used on the international stage: 'normalisation', 'fragmentation' and 'assimilation'. Based on an analysis of the emergence of the concept through these processes, he shows that the World Bank and the OECD have played an instrumental part in the development of transnational knowledge that promotes key Western-driven political standards, conceptions and beliefs. In Nay's interpretation the processes of making and shaping knowledge function as contemporary forms of international hegemony.
Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu shed light on the current orthodoxy of state building in 'fragile' states through the investigation of concept formation within the OECD-DAC. By combining an analysis of the discourse of the OECD with insights into how this discourse is produced, their paper reveals the underlying concept of 'legitimacy' that informs OECD reports and policies. Depending on how 'legitimacy' is conceived, the actions and practices of state builders can differ substantially. Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu identify two approaches to legitimacy under which most scholars and international organisations can be classified: the 'institutionalist' (or 'neo-Weberian') approach, focusing on institutional reconstruction, and the social legitimacy approach, emphasising the importance of social cohesion for successful state building. Through an analysis of the normative production of the OECD, the contribution shows that both conceptions are present in most of the institution's reports, but also that the neo-Weberian approach tends to prevail. The authors attribute this finding to the specific dynamics of knowledge production within the OECD: the norms of the organisation have become a way of being and working for insiders, and the practice of these norms by insiders helps to reproduce the organisation and its culture.
In her article Grimm criticises the fact that the EU has not (yet) agreed on a clear-cut definition of 'state fragility'. She highlights three factors that explain this situation: first, the Union's complex institutional framework, which impedes policy coherence; second, developments at the international level that require the Union's compliance; and third, the EU's diplomatic efforts to preserve cooperative relationships with aid-recipient countries that have been labelled 'fragile'. This last aspect reveals a central dilemma facing many aid donors: although they may seek to avoid classification via a label that is perceived as highly political, the lack of a clear-cut strategy to deal with the consequences of state 'fragility' can deprive donors of the capacity to develop meaningful and sustainable country-sensitive policies to overcome deficits in governance, socioeconomic development and security.
Siqueira critically assesses the role of indicators and statistics in the labelling and management of 'fragile states'. After emphasising the difficulties of attributing ownership of numerical claims in fragile contexts, she subsequently questions the validity and reliability of these quantitative classifications. Focusing on the education sector in Timor-Leste and on the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment approach, the article shows how accountability and ownership are negotiated within the context of the g7+ group of self-labelled 'fragile states', encouraging an examination of the power relations involved. She concludes that statistical schemes have become increasingly entrenched in international bureaucracy by means of a self-perpetuating process of 'improvement in use'. As a consequence, such schemes become ever more difficult to change. In accepting this reality, the g7+ does not resist the increasingly popular practice of 'fragility' quantification; instead, the group seeks to establish influence over 'numerical claims' by joining the 'multitude of allies' that contributes to the definition and characterisation of 'state fragility'.
The second set of contributors analyses the political use of the 'fragile state' label from a local perspective. These scholars focus on the reception, internalisation and reinterpretation of the 'fragile state' classification from a local perspective, highlighting local agency in the process. Gabrielsen-Jumbert analyses US responses to the conflict in Darfur, examining the ways in which the Sudanese state has been conceptualised by 'outsiders' and how this has affected international intervention. Her analysis reveals that, despite frequent descriptions of Sudan as a 'fragile' or 'failed' state, it is the label 'rogue state' that has truly taken hold in the Darfur context. This distinction has led to the prioritisation of strategies based on 'protection' and 'punishment' over attempts to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict, which a more sophisticated understanding of the Sudanese state's internal weaknesses and instability might have allowed.
In his contribution Heiduk illustrates how discourses on 'state fragility' have been instrumentalised by the Indonesian military in order to consolidate its political and economic powers since the fall of Suharto. In the wake of an impending process of state dissolution in post-Suharto Indonesia the military has managed to re-establish itself as the 'guardian of the nation' by exploiting fears of state disintegration and 'balkanisation'. In this way it has found a way to remove the issue of military reform from the political agenda while reclaiming its former privileges.
Fisher suggests that the aid-dependent government of Uganda has widened its room for manoeuvre with donors by emphasising the degree of instability in the north of the country. By referring to the notion of 'state fragility', the Ugandan regime has successfully persuaded donors to continue their support, despite its domestic transgressions. In parallel the regime has succeeded, according to Fisher, in taking advantage of a contradictory but equally persuasive international discourse that presents Uganda as stable, strong and secure. In exploring how Kampala has successfully employed both narratives to carve out greater agency with donors, the paper emphasises the significance of the donors' physical detachment from the Ugandan 'periphery' in this dynamic. Both Heiduk and Fisher highlight the way local actors have managed to re-appropriate the concept of 'state fragility' and translate it for their own purposes; the end result of such transformations may be far from the original intentions informing the use of the 'fragile state' categorisation.
In his concluding contribution to the issue Brinkerhoff identifies state fragility and failure as 'wicked problems' that affect both international policy discourses and international peace-and state-building interventions. The author explores the various dimensions of 'wicked problems', arguing that these features are easily observable in the fragile state arena. He also suggests that we view the use of the fragile state concept as 'an effort to tame the wickedness of the state fragility/failure problem set'. Complementing the analyses offered in this issue, he recommends not only an examination of the 'naming' and 'taming' of state fragility, but also the development of practices that could help both labellers and the labelled to overcome situations of fragility.
Conclusions
The contributions to this special issue suggest three main conclusions. First, diverging purposes are merged in the 'fragile states' label: the latter seeks to contribute to a conceptual approach addressing states' weaknesses, but at the same time it constitutes a normative tool and a policy label used extensively by international organisations and Western donor countries to legitimise their strategic objectives in foreign policy. Second, the definition of 'fragile states' is far from stable, despite the attempts by many international institutions to create a more rigorous definition. The term is used by various actors with different agendas to describe dissimilar national contexts of political disruption, institutional weakness and economic collapse. As a result, the concept is subject to a variety of interpretations, and its use as an analytical method of understanding the political, social and economic factors that may increase the vulnerability and instability of developing countries is highly problematic. The term 'fragile state' can be better understood as a 'policy narrative', as its meanings reflect the strategic visions and political goals of its main advocates. Finally, actors in so-called 'fragile states' have not remained passive in the process of the transnational dissemination of the concept. Their resources have allowed them 'to resist, ignore, engage with, disengage from, and exploit' international involvement. 34 It is our hope that this special issue will help to increase awareness of these wide-ranging dynamics and provide additional evidence of the limits of the simplistic categorisation of states through the use of the 'fragile states' label.
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